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bstract: Why should leaders of polities,
as representatives of citizens, be requi-
red to apologise and make reparations
for deeds committed in the historical past? As-
sumptions commonly made by liberals about the
scope of responsibility and the duties of citizens
make this question diﬃcult to answer. This paper
considers some unsuccessful attempts within a li-
beral framework to defend obligations of repara-
tion for historical injustices and puts forward an
account based on the lifetime-transcending inte-
rests of citizens.
In my country (Australia) the newly elected
Prime Minister recently opened Parliament by
making an oﬃcial apology to Aborigines and
Aboriginal communities for unjust policies of
the past – particularly for the attempts of past
governments to wipe out Aboriginal culture by
taking children away from their parents and
putting them in orphanages or foster homes.1
The apology was seconded by the Leader of the
Opposition. People from Aboriginal commu-
nities were in attendance, including some of
the individuals who had been ‘stolen’ as chil-
dren. The apology was watched on television
by millions of Australians, many of whom
strongly supported this act of coming to terms
with the past. 
This ceremony of apology is one example of at-
tempts by governments to address historical in-
justices. These attempts to make recompense,
though often welcomed and applauded, raise
diﬃcult moral and political issues.2 From a phi-
losophical point of view one of the basic questi-
ons raised by attempts to make up for the past
is why existing citizens and their governments
have a responsibility for apologising and making
recompense for historical injustices. 
Three propositions held by many liberals make
it diﬃcult to understand or justify acts of apo-
logising and making recompense for historical
injustices like the wrongs committed in course
of Australian history to Aborigines. According
to the first proposition, what matters in ethics
and political philosophy are the interests and
preferences of existing and future individuals,
their rights and responsibilities, or their ability
to be autonomous agents. The dead don’t
count. They have no rights and we owe them
no duties. Subscribing to this proposition thus
seems to rule out any historical claims or justi-
fications that appeal to the interests of the dead
or the demands that they once made. 
The second proposition is that individuals
share responsibility for an action if and only if
they participated in committing it, or at least
could have participated. Citizens of a demo-
cracy can be said to participate in the deeds of
their government if they participate or could
participate in the electoral process. But most
present citizens were not in the position to par-
ticipate in bringing about events that occurred
in the historical past, so they do not, according
to the proposition, share the responsibility and
cannot, as a collectivity of citizens, be expec-
ted to apologise and make recompense.3 The
third proposition emphasises this point by con-
tending that citizens of a democracy incur ob-
ligations only through consent or voluntary
action. They cannot inherit political responsi-
bilities from their familial or national prede-
cessors.4
These three propositions are deeply embedded
as assumptions in most liberal philosophies
and they stand in the way of any account of hi-
storical obligations. So if we are to justify the
idea that citizens ought to make recompense
for historical injustices, then either we have to
explain how liberals can find a way to reject or
circumvent them, or we have to abandon libe-
ralism. In this paper, I will examine some at-
tempts by liberals to justify the existence of
historical obligations and I will argue for an ac-
count that rejects the three propositions but
nevertheless has a claim to be described as ‘li-
beral’. 
History and rectification
If historical entitlements possessed by indivi-
duals or groups exist simply because of acts
that took place in the historical past – if they
do not depend on participation or consent of
existing people or the interests of the dead –
then reparative claims need not require the re-
jection of any liberal assumptions. A number
of liberals have adopted this approach to ex-
plaining how people can now be owed repara-
tion for historical deeds and why those who
had nothing to do with the wrongs must take
responsibility for ensuring that reparation is
paid. Nozick makes use of Locke’s theory of
how individuals acquire titles to property to
present a historical theory of entitlement that
has as its corollary a requirement of rectifica-
tion.5 If someone has been unjustly disposses-
sed then he or his heirs ought to receive ap-
propriate recompense and the passage of time,
the death of those who did the wrong, and the
innocence of present people make no diﬀe-
rence to the existence of this entitlement.
Those who are responsible for rectification ac-
quire this duty not because they belong to a
particular polity or family but because they
happen to have something to which they have
no rightful title. 
Boxill, also appealing to Locke, presents a si-
milar account of rectificatory obligations to ex-
plain why white Americans owe reparation to
African-Americans for the historical injustice
of slavery. Slave owners and everyone who con-
sented to slavery (Boxill assumes that they in-
cluded most white Americans living at that
time) harmed those who were slaves and owed
them reparation because of this harm, he says.
This reparation was not paid and the debt re-
mains outstanding. “Since present day African
Americans are the slaves’ heirs, and have inhe-
rited their rights to reparation, it follows that
they have inherited titles to a part of the assets
held by the entire white population.”6
The main diﬃculty faced by these historical ac-
counts of entitlement and obligation is explai-
ning how any historical act or omission has the
power to impose obligations that can persist
through the generations. Waldron plausibly ar-
gues that injustices tend to be superseded by
changes of condition or simply the passage of
time.7 Property rights, he thinks, are justifiable
because they enable people to carry out their
life plans. Appropriation without the consent
of the owner is clearly unjust, and victims of
this injustice are owed reparation. But if time
passes and reparation does not occur, the de-
mand for reparation loses its force. Others now
depend on the property for the pursuit of their
life plans and the dispossessed and their heirs
have had to find another way of living their
lives. Moreover, factors that result from histo-
rical change – increases in population, changes
of climate and the needs of present people –
tend (in his view) to override entitlements that
come from history. Boxill’s version of the hi-
storical entitlement thesis seems particularly
vulnerable to this consideration. If reparation
was owed to slaves for the harm that was done
to them, then how can anyone else inherit their
entitlement? If their descendants are suﬀering
from the eﬀects of slavery and from other in-
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justices, then they are also owed compensation.
But this is a diﬀerent matter.
Unjust enrichment 
Boxill’s position can be interpreted as an argu-
ment about unjust enrichment rather than an
argument about inheritance of entitlements to
particular assets. Present American citizens are
the beneficiaries of slavery and other injustices
to African-Americans just as present Australi-
ans have benefited from the wrongs done to
Aborigines. All white Americans, he says, owe
a debt because “The whole of each generation
of whites specified that only the whites of the
succeeding generations were permitted to own
or compete for the assets it was leaving be-
hind.”8 The benefits they gained, in other
words, depend on an injustice and the benefi-
ciaries ought to return at least some of their as-
sets to the heirs of those who were wrongly
dispossessed or exploited. The debt in question
is not a particular possession or form of com-
pensation which was owed to people of the
past and should now be paid to their heirs. It
exists only because the descendants of the vic-
tims of injustice have been unjustly prevented
from getting equitable benefits from the deeds
of the past. If, contrary to fact, African-Ameri-
cans and Aborigines were as well oﬀ as white
Americans or Australians, there would be no
unjust enrichment and thus no grounds for
compensation.
Since claims based on unjust enrichment, so
understood, depend crucially on the relative
benefits and burdens of existing people, it
might be argued that what is called for is not
reparation for past injustices, but an applica-
tion of requirements of distributive justice.
Distributive theories, like that of Rawls, insist
that those who have gained more than their
fair share from past transactions should com-
pensate those who have less than their fair
share. Why should it matter whether the ine-
quity was the result of past injustices or some
other occurrence such as a natural disaster?
Sometimes it does seem to matter. Suppose,
says Gosseries, that someone finds money in
his house and uses it to buy expensive wine,
later discovering that the money is counterfeit
and that his wine merchant has thereby suﬀe-
red a loss.9 It is reasonable to suppose that the
person, though innocent of wrongdoing,
should return at least something of the gains
he has made to the one who has suﬀered loss.
Similarly, if you discover that your family for-
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tune is the result of your father or grandfather
cheating his clients, many of whom are now li-
ving in poverty, you might reasonably believe
that the fact that your wealth was gained at the
expense of others gives you a special responsi-
bility to share at least some of these assets with
those who suﬀered loss. However, it is proba-
ble that the further back in the past the inju-
stice lies and the more that the situation of the
heirs of the victims seems to be the result of
other factors, the less inclined you will be to
think that you have a personal responsibility to
the descendants of victims – as opposed to a
general, social responsibility based on duties of
distributive justice. If claims based on unjust
enrichment fade away, then it is an unpromi-
sing basis for historical obligations. 
There are further disadvantages to basing an ac-
count of responsibility for reparation on an ap-
peal to unjust enrichment. In the case of many
injustices, no enrichment has been gained by
present citizens. Most Australian citizens have
gained nothing from the policy of taking Ab-
original children away from their families. And
if social and psychological harms, as well as
economic costs, are taken into account, there
are grounds for believing that slavery in the US
has resulted in higher costs to the white popu-
lation than benefits. Moreover, some of the
worst injustices of history – genocide, torture,
use of ‘comfort women’ – are not properly trea-
ted by legalistic forms of reparation that have
to do with loss of assets and the re-
turn of property. What seems to be
required to do justice in the eyes of
the victims or their heirs is not me-
rely monetary compensation but
some form of oﬃcial apology and a
demonstration of contrition. It was
such a demand that the Australian Prime Mi-
nister was responding to. But such acts fly in
the face of the liberal propositions discussed
above. How can an apology be oﬀered by
people who played no role in committing the
injustice and how can it be given to those who
are not the actual victims but their descen-
dants?
Restitution as reconciliation
Apologies and token gestures of compensation
might be incorporated into the liberal frame-
work by treating them not as an admission of
responsibility and a demonstration of contri-
tion but as a way of providing solace, recogni-
tion or ‘closure’ to victims or their descendants
– as a way of reconciling communities within
a political society. Waldron seems to take this
position when he points out that historical me-
mory is central to the identity of many people
and that the suﬀering caused to present people
by their memories of historical injustice can be
best dealt with by oﬀering an apology and ma-
king other token gestures.10 These gestures are
made to the living, not the dead, and since
they are really about achieving good relations-
hips in the present and future, they do not in-
volve the acceptance of responsibility for
historical acts or the debts of past people. 
The problem with this way of understanding
acts of apology for historical injustices is that it
means that these apologies are insincere. They
do not mean what apologies are supposed to
mean – those who make them are not admit-
ting responsibility to those whom they victi-
mised - and yet their aﬀect on present people
seems to require that people take the apology
as meaning what apologies are supposed to
mean.11 If recipients of the apology come to be-
lieve that the act was only done for the purpose
of making them feel better, they would proba-
bly reject it. Moreover, the reconciliatory ap-
proach to apology leads to the question of why
apologise at all for historical injustices. There
are probably more eﬃcient, and certainly more
honest, ways of making people feel better
about the past of their community – psycho-
logical counselling for example. 
Giving the dead their due  
Ridge points out that by dropping the first li-
beral assumption - that the only individuals
who count in theories of justice and right are
present and future people - we can provide an
economical account of why we should oﬀer
apologies and reparation for historic injustices.
If we believe that we can harm or benefit the
dead, then it is clear why reparation is required.
Their rights were violated; they are owed.
Though we cannot directly compensate them,
we can promote objectives that we have reason
to believe that they cared about. ‘Most slaves
probably cared very much about the welfare of
their descendants, so the United States could
provide reparations to the slaves by promoting
the welfare of their descendants.’12 And though
we cannot apologise directly to the dead we
can apologise to their descendants who act in
this situation as their representatives. 
Ridge’s account makes the controversial as-
sumption that has been defended by a few phi-
losophers but opposed by others – that the
dead can be harmed and benefited.13 He also
assumes that these harms and benefits are suﬃ-
ciently weighty so as to motivate us to engage
in political acts or to make the sacrifices requi-
red by reparation. These assumptions have im-
plications for moral and political philosophy
that are largely unexplored. But the more im-
mediate problem is that making these assump-
tions does not solve the problem of collective
responsibility and inherited debt. Why should
present citizens take responsibility for injusti-
ces that they had no role in committing? Why
should they believe that they have a moral debt
inherited from their predecessors?
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Another approach
Working in a liberal framework, we have so far
failed to find an account that makes sense of,
or adequately justifies, apology and reparation
for historical injustices. There are several re-
sponses that can be made to this failure. We
might abandon the third proposition of libe-
ralism and lay it down (as does Ridge) that ci-
tizenship simply requires people to accept an
obligation to make recompense and reparation
for what members of their polity did in the
past. Treating states as agents that are accoun-
table for the actions of past governments is a
widely accepted legal convention. But libera-
lism has traditionally refused to take obligati-
ons of citizenship as given. It has always asked
why individuals should accept them. Indeed,
some liberals have regarded it as unjust that
past citizens can impose burdens on their suc-
cessors. “One generation is to another as one
independent nation to another”, said Thomas
Jeﬀerson, thus insisting on the right of citizens
of each generation to re-make their instituti-
ons, commitments and policies according to
their own interests and values.14 Jeﬀerson, who
was himself the maker of constitutions, was in-
consistent on this point, but it would be better,
philosophically speaking, if we could provide
an answer to the question of why citizens
should take responsibility for the deeds of past
generations. 
Another more drastic response is to abandon
liberalism. Communitarians and others who
stress the communal source of identity have no
diﬃculty explaining why we have historical ob-
ligations. Says MacIntyre: “I belong to this
clan, this tribe, this nation. Hence what is good
for me has to be the good for one who inhabits
these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of
my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a va-
riety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectati-
ons and obligations.”15 But for those who lack
these tribal certainties, whose sources of iden-
tity are more diverse or who fail to identify
with their nation or their forebears, a move
from identity to obligation is unappealing. So
let us return to the question of whether a ju-
stification can be found within the liberal fra-
mework.
The position that I will defend rejects the three
propositions that so many people regard as
fundamental to liberalism. Nevertheless, it
counts as a liberal approach in so far as it rests
on an even more basic liberal assumption: that
the justification for a political society, and the
duties it assigns to citizens, is its continuing
commitment and capacity to protect and un-
derwrite their ability to define and pursue their
own good and to obtain the resources and to
secure the conditions that they need, whatever
good they decide to pursue. My contention is
that when we take into account what it means
to most people to live a meaningful life we will
understand why the obligations of citizens
must be intergenerational and why they can
have duties in respect to the historical past.16
My strategy is to re-examine the starting point
for all liberal theories: the interests and needs
of individuals. I will argue that these interests
and needs require institutions that enable citi-
zens to make and have fulfilled lifetime-trans-
cending demands in the framework of an
intergenerational polity that is prepared to take
responsibility for the past.
Lifetime-transcending interests
To support this thesis, I make three claims
which I cannot defend adequately here. I want
to establish that they are at least plausible. The
first is that all or most citizens pursued inte-
rests can be described as lifetime-transcending.
Rawls in A Theory of Justice assumes that ‘fath -
ers of families’ will be concerned about what
happens to their descendants and that this will
motivate an acceptance of duties to future ge-
nerations.17 An interest in the well-being of
descendants is clearly a lifetime-transcending
interest. But it is important to recognise that
people’s goals, including those of childless in-
dividuals, generally involve interests that are
lifetime-transcending. Artists and academics
may strive to produce works that they hope
will be appreciated by people of the future; at
least they like to think of themselves as making
a contribution, however small, to a tradition
or a practice that they hope and assume will
continue indefinitely into the future. People
work for ideals and reforms that they hope will
triumph in the future, they care about the fu-
ture fate of their communities, or they simply
want their existence and their eﬀorts to be pro-
perly remembered by future members of their
group.18
Not all people have goals that are explicitly life-
time-transcending. A businessman may be in-
terested only in building up his business and
making a good profit and may not care what
happens after his death. We can think of lots of
cases, real or imaginary, where people are pre-
occupied by interests that do not transcend
their lifetimes. But it is important to note that
these lifetime centred interests often depend,
whether the individuals recognise it or not, on
what people do after their deaths or on the per-
sistence of a particular state of aﬀairs. The busi-
nessman would probably not want people to
claim after his death that he got his fortune in
an illicit way or that he was not good at run-
ning a business. He is likely to want those
whose opinions he cares about to respect his
achievements, and he is likely to care about the
persistence of a way of valuing that rates run-
ning a successful business as an admirable en-
terprise. I would not be so rash as to claim that
everyone has lifetime-transcending interests.
But, then, not everyone cares about other
goods that liberals think that societies ought to
protect. 
My second claim is that having lifetime-trans-
cending interests is central to living a mea-
ningful life. On this matter, philosophers who
have discussed the ‘good life’ generally agree.
According to Partridge, “Well functioning
human beings identify with, and seek to furth -
er, the well-being, preservation and endurance
of communities, locations, causes, artefacts, in-
stitutions, ideals, and so on, that are outside
themselves and that they hope will flourish
beyond their lifetimes”, and he uses data from
psychology to back this up.19 To seek a mea-
ningful life, says Nozick, is to seek to transcend
the limits of one’s individual life.20 A mea-
ningful life, claims Wolf, is one in which a per-
son actively engages in projects of worth – a
pursuit that requires commitment to some-
thing enduring.21 Lomasky similarly claims
that a commitment to long-term projects that
persist over time and project into the future is
an important component of a person’s iden-
tity.22 Essential to a human agent, says Taylor,
is the capacity to be a strong evaluator: “to eva-
luate the worth of one’s projects or one’s life,
and this requires that he or she subscribes to a
higher order of good such as justice, God, aes-
thetic beauty or knowledge, that makes him
part of something larger than his own life.”23
It would also be rash to claim that no one can
live a life that he or she finds meaningful wit-
hout having lifetime-transcending interests.
But the fact that having lifetime-transcending
goals and interests is so often central to living
a meaningful life, means that individuals ought
to have an opportunity to acquire goals that in-
volve lifetime-transcending interests. And if
this opportunity is to be real then they must
live in a society that enables them to acquire
goals that they have a reasonable chance satis-
fying. A society can be judged according to the
range of options it provides to individuals to
pursue goals that they can find meaningful. A
liberal society will provide individuals with a
large range of options to acquire and pursue
lifetime-transcending interests.  
My third, and most controversial, claim is that
their lifetime-transcending interests can give
individuals a justification for making demands
of their survivors or successors. Consider the
widely held view that it is wrong to destroy the
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reputations of those who are dead by telling
malicious untruths about their lives. To con-
demn this as wrong we do not need to suppose
that the dead can be harmed by malicious lies.
It is suﬃcient to appreciate why the living care
about their posthumous reputation. They may
care because of the harm that slander could do
to their objectives, projects, ideals, and the
people they love. Or they may care because
they want their eﬀorts, accomplishments, and
objectives to be properly appreciated after their
death by those whose opinion they respect, and
by the members of groups and institutions to
which they made contributions. In either case,
their lifetime-transcending interest in their re-
putation makes it legitimate for them to de-
mand of their survivors that their posthumous
reputation be protected. For if a person
thought that her posthumous reputation
would be vulnerable to those who would have
no compunction against telling malicious lies
for their own gratification or profit, she could
not with confidence pursue lifetime-transcen-
ding projects and causes, or believe that what
she did would make a contribution or have a
chance of being appreciated. She could not be
confident that her attempts to provide benefits
for her children and community would not be
subverted by the suﬀering that they would later
be caused. Her ability to achieve important ob-
jectives and to give her life meaning would be
seriously undermined. In other words, her so-
ciety would have failed to provide support for
people to develop objectives that are central to
living a meaningful life. 
These considerations give members of a society
reason to support a practice that requires sur-
vivors to protect the posthumous reputations
of the dead. The motivation is not merely our
own self-interest in our reputations but an ap-
preciation of how protection of posthumous
reputation contributes to the ability of indivi-
duals to live meaningful lives and to protect
people and things that they care about. And
given that we have good reasons, moral and
pragmatic, for accepting the practice, we are
also obliged to accept a duty to protect the re-
putations of those whom we survive. 
Not all demands made by people of their suc-
cessors are legitimate. I may desire that my
children adhere to particular religious beliefs
but I am not entitled to demand that they do
so. I am not entitled to demand that my suc-
cessors continue my projects. But it is not so
implausible to suppose that I am entitled to de-
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mand that they remember and appreciate the
sacrifices that I have made for their sake. In ge-
neral, a person can determine what she is en-
titled to demand of her successors by
considering what she would accept as a legiti-
mate demand of her predecessors. 
Historical obligations
A liberal society ought to ensure that indivi-
duals are able to develop and pursue goals that
involve lifetime-transcending interests and it
ought to underwrite the performance of duties
that arise from legitimate lifetime-transcending
demands. A liberal polity that answers to these
requirements is one in which citizens regard
themselves as participants in relationships of
intergenerational cooperation with the aim of
maintaining institutions and practices that en-
able these requirements to be fulfilled. Citizens
through the generations have the duty of en-
suring that institutions and practices that en-
able legitimate lifetime-transcending demands
to be fulfilled are maintained. They have the
responsibility of maintaining institutions and
practices, in the framework of which, indivi-
duals can develop and eﬀectively pursue goals
involving lifetime-transcending interests.
Their obligations arise from two sources: first
of all, from the legitimate lifetime-transcen-
ding demands of citizens; and secondly from a
consideration of how polities and other inter-
generational groups, as associations of indivi-
duals with lifetime-transcending interests,
ought to treat each other and to treat other in-
tergenerational associations.
If citizens can make legitimate lifetime-trans-
cending demands, then there should be insti-
tutions and practices that ensure that they are
fulfilled and these institutions must also en-
sure, where appropriate, that recompense is
made for a failure to fulfil them. Given the im-
portance of their lifetime-transcending inte-
rests it seems reasonable, for example, that
individuals should be able to provide an inhe-
ritance for their children or that they should
be able to pass on a project to those who might
be interested in continuing it. Though indivi-
duals cannot demand that their successors con-
tinue their projects, it seems reasonable that
their society ought to underwrite their desire
to pass on their projects to those who might be
interested in pursuing them. So understood,
entitlements of bequest and inheritance have a
justification, though a society can legitimately
choose to put limits on these entitlements for
the sake of promoting greater equity. Never-
theless, a just society should provide some in-
stitutional support for bequest and inheritance.
Within the framework of its institutions indi-
viduals can make legitimate demands concer-
ning the disposal of their possessions, and if
these demands are not properly fulfilled, and
there is no justified excuse, then restitution is
owed to the heirs for their failure to obtain
what was due to them. These considerations
allow an appeal to rights of property as a basis
for some historical obligations without having
to subscribe to implausible ideas about histo-
rical entitlements that cannot be challenged by
appeals to present needs and circumstances.24
The second source of historical obligations and
entitlements comes from a consideration of
how intergenerational communities, whether
polities or communities of other kinds, should
treat each other and should treat other inter-
generational groups given that their members
have lifetime-transcending, as well as lifetime,
interests. If we accept the idea that polities and
communities ought to treat each other with re-
spect (unless there is good reason not to do so),
then this requires that they should respect each
other as intergenerational communities. Out
of respect, they ought to strive to reach long-
term understandings and agreements with each
other when their interactions make this ap-
propriate, and out of respect for each other as
intergenerational societies they ought to keep
their agreements unless there is a good moral
reason not to do so. If they fail to be properly
respectful of each other or fail to keep their
agreements without a good excuse then they
commit an injustice and incur an obligation of
reparation. If this obligation is not fulfilled by
the present generation, then it becomes a duty
of their successors. Just as individuals have ob-
ligations to fulfil legitimate demands of those
they survive, they also, as citizens, have an ob-
ligation to keep the legitimate agreements
made by their predecessors and to make re-
compense for their failure to treat other inter-
generational communities respectfully. Those
who deny that this responsibility exists fail to
appreciate the nature and justification of a so-
ciety in which people have intergenerational
responsibilities. 
Polities have intergenerational responsibilities
to each other. The idea that polities ought to
act as responsible intergenerational agents –
thus committing their citizens to accept histo-
rical responsibilities – is supported by reference
to the interests of citizens. But we can argue
for the same reason, that polities and their ci-
tizens have intergenerational responsibilities in
respect to other groups that enable individuals
to pursue lifetime-transcending interests or are
the focus of their lifetime-transcending de-
mands: tribes, ethnic groups and even families.
Slavery as it was practiced in the Southern
states of the USA was an injustice not merely
to individuals, but also to family lines, and the
Jim Crow laws introduced by Southern states
after the Civil War were designed to keep the
families of former slaves in a position of per-
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petual subordination. This way of understan-
ding historical injustices like slavery make it in-
telligible why present people, as members of a
family or a tribe that has suﬀered from a hi-
story of related injustices, can be owed repara-
tion for injustice that includes acts committed
in past generations. 
It also makes intelligible the giving of apolo-
gies. An apology is an act of taking responsibi-
lity that is given by the members of one
intergenerational community to the members
of another. It is an acknowledgment of the en-
titlements of individuals as members of such a
community. Present members of a polity can
have a responsibility through their representa-
tives of apologising for a historical injustice just
as they can have a responsibility for reparation
in other forms.
Conclusion
The account that I have oﬀered of why citizens
have historical responsibilities rejects all three
of the propositions commonly associated with
liberalism. It contends that demands made by
those who are now dead can be the source of
obligation (though it does not require belie-
ving that the dead can be benefited by what we
do). It gives citizens responsibilities for deeds
that they had no part in committing and it re-
quires them to fulfil obligations that they in-
herit from their political predecessors.
Nevertheless, the account is based on a view
about the relationship between individuals and
their political society that is even more funda-
mental to liberalism. Whether this is enough
to make it a liberal theory is up to others to
judge. But liberal or not, it is an account that
answers to the beliefs that many people have
about their responsibilities as citizens: the be-
liefs that motivated many Australians to wel-
come and applaud the apology made to
Aborigines and their communities. 
Notes:
(1) In the words of Rudd: “We apologise for the laws and
policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have
inflicted profound grief, suﬀering and loss on these our fel-
low Australians. We apologise especially for the removal of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their fa-
milies, their communities and their country” (Rudd 2008). 
(2) I have written specifically on this issue in Thompson
2008.
(3) This view was presented by the former Prime Minister of
Australia John Howard, as a reason for not apologising: See
Howard 1997.
(4) I am assuming, as do most liberal political philosophers
that a democratic polity consists of its citizens whose repre-
sentatives govern in their name through the institutions of
state. Citizens, according to this view are responsible for
what their representatives do.
(5) Nozick 1974: 151-153.
(6) Boxill 2003: 77.
(7) Waldron 1992: 18-19.
(8) Boxill 2003: 76.
(9) Gosseries 2004: 9.
(10) Waldron 1992: 6.
(11) All accounts of the meaning of apology that I have en-
countered stipulate that the one who apologises takes re-
sponsibility for the act in question. See, for example, Davies
2002 and Gill 2000.
(12) Ridge 2003: 44.
(13) Feinberg 1984: Chapter 2, argues that the dead can be
benefitted or harmed by our actions. For a criticism of this
account, see Lamont 1998.
(14) Jeﬀerson 1907: 456.
(15) MacIntyre 1981: 204-205.
(16) ‘Generation’ is a vague, but useful term. In this con-
text, present generations are those who are in the position to
participate, in one way or another, in making policies that
will aﬀect the young and unborn, and past generations con-
sist of citizens who are now not in this position.
(17) Rawls 1971: 288.
(18) See Meyer 1997: 141-143.
(19) Partridge 1981: 204-207.
(20) Nozick 1989: 166-167.
(21) Wolf 1997: 211.
(22) Lomasky 1987: 32.
(23) Taylor 1989: 63-73.
(24) I have defended these ideas about inheritance and re-
paration in Thompson 2001.  
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